An Unclear Present Danger: The Future of Mine Warfare Is Deception

“All warfare is based on deception,” writes Sun Tzu in his seminal work, The Art of War. “When using our forces, we must appear inactive; when we are near, we must make the enemy believe we are far away.” These words ring particularly true when considering the future of minelaying, a largely overlooked but potentially decisive element of naval warfare. As global attention focuses on hypersonic missiles, armed quadcopters, loitering munitions, and attack USVs, it could be mines, minelaying, and mine countermeasures (MCM) that ultimately shape the course of future wars.

The popular depiction of sea mines often involves dense underwater forests of classic “spiky balls” and chains - moored contact mines deployed in structured minefields to achieve strategic or operational objectives. While this impression isn’t mistaken (cheap and effective contact mines can still be found in the inventories of navies worldwide, and have been deployed as recently as the Russo-Ukraine War), it fails to capture the gravity of the modern sea mine threat, now characterized by multi-influence sensors, sophisticated activation algorithms, and counter-countermeasure capabilities.

Modern mines can be deployed using air, surface, or undersea military assets, but in an era of rapidly growing maritime domain awareness and expanding weapon engagement zones (WEZs), conventional minelaying will be increasingly risky. Submarines are highly effective covert minelaying platforms, but their multi-mission profile will place them in high demand, and the increasing presence of littoral anti-submarine networks could constrain their use in a mine warfare role. Aircraft can rapidly deploy mines over large areas, but are vulnerable to modern air defenses, while minelaying ships face threats from land, sea, and air. Mine stocks and minelaying platforms could also be preemptively targeted, effectively removing them from the board before the game even begins. Of course, overt minelaying can serve as a valuable deterrent, signaling an adversary before hostilities begin, but it is covert expeditionary mining, designed to achieve objectives within or near adversary waters, that can effectively disrupt, delay, or deny an enemy freedom of movement in the maritime domain.

If conventional minelaying methods can be blunted by enemy sensors and weapons, how could mine warfare play a role in future conflict? Because mines can be deployed covertly from a wide range of non-military platforms - commercial cargo vessels, fishing boats, passenger vessels, and even unmanned surface vehicles (USVs). This flexibility, in addition to its highly advanced capabilities, makes the modern sea mine a persistent, insidious, and evolving challenge.

A potential cross-strait conflict between China and Taiwan provides a compelling case study. Defense analysts have raised alarms over China’s rapid shipbuilding, warning that any large-scale Chinese amphibious assault could involve civilian RORO ferries. If Chinese civil-military integration could enable such a dual-use amphibious fleet, it is entirely plausible that it could also enable commercial cargo vessels to serve as cover for clandestine Chinese minelaying operations. Despite heightened tensions, Taiwan remains one of China’s largest trading partners, and Chinese flagged cargo ships originating in Dalian, Ningbo, and other Chinese ports routinely pass within ten nautical miles of Zuoying Naval Base while enroute to Kaohsiung, Taiwan’s “Maritime Capital.” These waters are less than 300 meters deep, well within the WEZ of modern bottom mines.

Deploying Mines from Cargo Ships

Three commercial-off-the-shelf containerized mine warfare solutions already exist, and can provide insight into a notional Chinese deployment system. The CUBE from SH Defence, a Danish provider of turnkey maritime equipment solutions, is a containerized minelaying system using a conveyor belt to deploy different mine types. Finnish munitions company Forcit Defence produces SUMICO, a minelaying system designed to fit inside a 40-foot shipping container that can deploy various types of bottom mines, including Forcit’s Blocker mine, which can be deployed at depths of up to 200 meters for up to two years. And Rheinmetall Defence Australia, through a partnership with Supashock, has developed the Mine Rail Deployment System (MRDS) to deploy cylindrical bottom mines, such as Rheinmetall’s Murena and Asteria mines, which can operate at depths up to 300 meters. Strategically positioned at a cargo ship’s stern, containerized systems like these could discreetly deploy mines while transiting the shipping lanes along the west coast of Taiwan, making multiple passes over weeks or months. The mines would then lie in wait, dormant, until activated by an acoustic signal.

This concept could apply to other strategic waterways, such as the Baltic Sea, where commercial vessels are already widely suspected to be engaging in seabed warfare by sabotaging submarine cables. With the ability to covertly deploy mines from civilian ships, any port or maritime chokepoint could potentially be vulnerable.

Unmanned surface vehicles (USVs) may also play a role in future minelaying. Ukrainian Sea Baby USVs have been observed carrying pairs of Italian-made Manta bottom mines, and there are reports that minelaying Ukrainian USVs may have been responsible for damaging the Russian guided missile corvette Samum. The destructive power of Mantas is well known. During Operation Desert Storm, two Iraqi Manta mines armed with just 325 pounds of explosives each achieved a mission kill on the USS Princeton, a 9,800 ton guided missile cruiser. If a small USV like Sea Baby can deploy two Manta mines, a medium USV could accommodate even larger payloads, perhaps by integrating a Cube- or SUMICO-style containerized mechanical conveyor, or an angled, gravity-assisted deployment system, for remotely controlled or semi-autonomous minelaying. Disguised as fishing boats, port security vessels, or high-speed recreational watercraft, unmanned minelayers could reseed or saturate existing minefields at minimum risk.

Covertly laid minefields allow naval forces to be “near while appearing far,” and the ability to deploy advanced sea mines from civilian and unmanned platforms would be a key operational enabler. As maritime competition intensifies in contested regions like the Taiwan Strait and the Baltic Sea, mine warfare will likely play a role in shaping future conflicts, and the ability to leverage deception for minelaying at scale could provide a decisive asymmetric advantage.